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Against Theory-Theory and Simulation-Theory approaches to social cognition, 
Shaun Gallagher has advanced a phenomenologically and hermeneutically 
sophisticated alternative he calls “Direct Perception.”  Gallagher argues that we 
require neither inferential nor analogical access to others’ mindedness, since that 
mindedness is available to us directly in their expressive, interactive, and 
intentional involvement in a shared situation. Starting with expression and 
intentional interactions that unfold in the spaces between us, Direct Perception 
promises greater descriptive adequacy and substantial leverage into the problem 
of other minds than its competitors can offer.   
 
Direct perception has many features that are appealing from a feminist 
perspective: it treats persons as fundamentally social, contextual, interactive, and 
embodied, while giving reasonable and appropriate attention to developmental 
psychology.  In doing so, it helps to circumvent risks of solipsism and projection 
that dog many familiar approaches to others. However, it is less clear whether, as 
a theory, Direct Perception can offer ways to avoid the structural encoding of 
power dynamics that Marilyn Fry diagnosed as “arrogant perception.” Indeed, 
there is a serious danger that Direct Perception, like many of its hermeneutically 
oriented precursors, might be complicit in such power structures by squeezing out 
the space for critical social inquiry that the gap between self and other ought to 
foster. 
 
Frye defined arrogant perception as a tendency of those in power to arrogate 
others to serve their interests, not only in practice, but at the very level of 
perception. The wrong perpetrated on arrogated others operates “invisibly” 
precisely to the extent that these interests structure what can become visible at all, 
while the structuring power itself remains invisible, operating “behind the scenes.”  
Frye’s own prescription of “loving perception” is inadequate to address this 
wrong for reasons that Direct Perception can help to articulate.  Loving perception 
makes demands on the individual intentional attitudes of the participating 
subjects, but the true level of damage belongs to a space between such subjects, 
one that structures their expressive and intentional possibilities, rather than vice 
versa. Lugones notion of world-travelling does a better job addressing the depth 
of the problem, since it acknowledges the power of the structuring in-betweens 
and calls for their plurification. Still, her plea for “playfulness” remains vague. In 
the final section of this paper, I argue that Direct Perception can learn from 
Lugones’s move away from the hermeneutic framework of rule-governed play 
and toward an ethos of playfulness.  Meanwhile, Direct Perception’s attention to 
interactive expressivism, with its debt to Merleau-Ponty’s intercorporeity, can help 
to fill in what this playfulness might look like.  What I call “critical intercorporeity” 
allows us to explore how expressivity not only undergirds intelligibility, but might 
disrupt it as well, plausibly and playfully taking aim at the arrogating, embedded 
structures that govern visibility.        
 
